Jarkko wrote:
However, I have noticed that if you come to the Forum
using the links on the front page of the Files,
then you have to log-in again.
I have not yet found explanation to this;
must be some kind of conflicting cookies.
I think it's a security "feature",
having to do with "cross-domain security",
and framesets.
because the Files
http://www.leonardcohenfiles.com
and the Forum
http://www.leonardcohenforum.com
are really different "domains".
So, if you're logged in to the Forum
and then left-click on the "Forum/Message Board" link
on the Files front page
http://www.leonardcohenfiles.com ,
so that the Forum page appears in the right-side frame
of the Files fameset, then this Forum page is not really
in its proper
http://www.leonardcohenforum.com domain.
Rather, it's in the File's frameset's domain,
http://www.leonardcohenfiles.com
where it doesn't have access to
http://www.leonardcohenforum.com cookies.
So you won't still be logged-in, that way.
On the other hand, if you were logged in,
and right-clicked on the "Forum/Message Board" link,
and used "Open in a New Tab" or page or whatever,
-- in other words, if you "break out of the frameset",
then the new independant page
will be in its proper domain.
And so you'll still be logged-in, that way.
I think this is one reason why "framesets" are "depreciated".
(And they can be complicated. But I am not
convinced that they're really all that bad.
All the alternatives anyway, it seems to me,
are either worse, or not ripe yet.)
Anyway, this annoying behavior is really about
a patched vulnerability (See quotes below)
The domain security model has been a moving target
over the last several years, and several sudden changes
in it have caused a lot of cursing.
But you have to think positive.
It's like when your alarm clock goes off in the morning,
- it really means that another angel has gotten its wings.
Which is a good thing.
Likewise, whenever something about the internet sudden
breaks for no good reason, it usually means that another
vulnerablity has been patched.
Which is always a good thing.
What is meant by "IE's cross-domain security model"?
One of the principal security functions of a browser is to ensure that browser windows
that are under the control of different web sites cannot interfere with each other or access
each other's data, while allowing windows from the same site to interact with each other.
To differentiate between cooperative and uncooperative browser windows, the concept
of a "domain" has been created. A domain is a security boundary - any open windows
within the same domain can interact with each other, but windows from different domains cannot.
The "cross-domain security model" is the part of the security architecture that keeps windows
from different domains from interfering with each other.
The simplest example of a domain is associated with web sites.
If you visit
http://www.microsoft.com, and it opens a window to
http://www.microsoft.com/security,
the two windows can interact with each because both belong to the same
domain,
http://www.microsoft.com. However, if you visited
http://www.microsoft.com,
and it opened a window to a different web site, the cross-domain security model
would protect the two windows from each other. ...
--
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/securi ... 0-009.mspx
Does this vulnerability let a browser window read what's in another browser window?
Almost. In this case, the issue is the ability of a window to read a frame
that's in a different domain. A browser window can contain frames
- subdivisions of a window that operate independently of each other.
An example of a window that uses frames would be a web page
in which a navigation bar on one side of the screen stays fixed
while the content in the center of the screen changes as you make your selection.
The navigation bar is in one frame, and the content is in another.
If the frames belong to different domains, the IE cross-domain model
should protect them from each other.
However, in this vulnerability, flaws in two functions allow this protection to be breached.
What happens in this vulnerability?
In this vulnerability, a malicious web site opens a browser window on the user's computer.
Within that window, the site opens a frame, and displays a file from the user's local computer in it.
This is legitimate usage, but the window and the frame are in different domains
- the window is in the web site's domain, while the frame is in the local file system domain
- so the cross-domain security model should prevent them from reading each other's data.
However, implementation flaws in two functions allow the window to access the data
that is displayed in the frame. This would allow script running in the window
to send the contents of the frame to the malicious user's web site.
What's the flaw in the functions?
The functions do not check which domain the frame is in
before giving the window access to it.
--
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/securi ... 0-033.mspx
"Unauthorized Cookie Access" Vulnerability: Frequently Asked Questions
What's this bulletin about?
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-033 announces the availability of a patch that eliminates a vulnerability in Microsoft® Internet
Explorer. Under some conditions, the vulnerability could allow a malicious web site operator to access cookies that have been placed
on the computer of a visiting user by other web sites. Microsoft is committed to protecting customers' information, and is providing
the bulletin to inform customers of the vulnerability and what they can do about it.
--
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/securi ... 0-033.mspx